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WUSHENG YU AND HANS G. JENSEN 
Abstract 
The July package of the Doha Round of trade negotiations stipulates that a tiered-
formula approach should be used to significantly reduce market access barriers across 
countries, implying that the EU would have to make larger cuts to its high external 
tariffs, in comparison with many other WTO members such as the US. This paper 
provides a preliminary assessment of the likely impact of the tiered-formula reform 
approach on EU agricultural sectors. Numerical simulations of a multilateral market-
access reform scenario show that such cuts would lead to across-the-board decreases in 
intra-EU trade flows, as compared with a baseline projection. While intra-EU trade 
flows would decrease, the EU’s trade with the rest of the world would increase. Yet 
such increases would not be symmetric – imports into the EU would increase more than 
exports, resulting in larger external trade deficits or smaller external trade surpluses in 
many EU agricultural products. Further, the resulting adjustments in member states’ 
production and net trade positions are not equal: the new member states would generally 
lose part of their export shares in the EU market to external competitors, as highlighted 
in the cases of bovine meat and dairy products.  
Finally, simulation results show that although EU welfare as a whole improves, the 
distribution of such gains across EU member states is uneven. EU-15 countries 
generally gain from improved efficiency as a result of the reform. The new member 
states, however, will only experience marginal efficiency improvements but will likely 
suffer terms-of-trade losses, thereby losing some of the related benefits of joining the 
EU (as projected in the baseline case). 
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1. Introduction 
After the setback in Cancun, agricultural trade negotiations within the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) have moved back on track with the agreement to the July package. 
While the negotiations are being conducted in three different areas (market access, export 
competition and domestic support), reducing market access barriers is once again at the heart 
of intense negotiations. This is because virtually all the WTO members maintain at least some 
market access barriers. And for many of the less-developed countries, such barriers are the 
only instruments used for protecting their agricultural markets and for generating tariff 
revenue. Therefore, analysing the impact of further market access reforms is a pressing issue 
and the purpose of this preliminary study. 
The current negotiations exert further pressure on the European Union to reduce its high 
import barriers in a number of areas. The July package stipulates that a tiered-formula 
approach shall be used to reduce these barriers. Such an approach would result in larger cuts 
to higher tariffs and would require members with higher barriers to shoulder greater reform 
commitments. This is indeed a significant deviation from the Uruguay Round approach, 
which applied homogeneous, average cuts across member countries.  
If the tiered-formula approach indeed becomes operational at the conclusion of the Doha 
Round, the EU as a whole would need to open its market more than many other WTO 
members. This would likely lead to non-trivial changes in the production and trade patterns of 
heavily protected agricultural products and would possibly elicit a shift of gravity from intra-
EU trade to extra-EU trade. Furthermore, there would be an important redistribution of intra-
EU trade among the 25 EU member countries as their natural comparative advantages in 
different products would be reconfigured. Finally, some of the benefits of joining the EU for 
the new EU member states may be eroded as a result of the opening up of the EU market to 
non-member countries. 
This preliminary study attempts to analyse the potential impact of likely market-access 
reforms on the EU and its individual member countries after the completion of EU 
enlargement. Particular attention is paid to the production and trade positions of each member 
country in key agricultural and food products. The full, economy-wide effects of these 
reforms are also illustrated by examining the welfare effects of such reforms.  
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we briefly introduce the method and database 
used for the quantitative analysis. Section 3 is devoted to the baseline and the market-access 
reform scenarios. Results of the scenarios are presented in section 4. Section 5 provides a 
summary and some concluding remarks. 2 | YU & JENSEN 
 
2. Methodology  and  database 
We use a global general equilibrium model to simulate the impact of possible multilateral 
market-access reforms resulting from the Doha Round. This model is a variant of the GTAP 
model (Hertel, 1997). Numerous policy features of the common agricultural policy (CAP) 
have been refined in the modified model to make it more suitable for agricultural trade policy 
analysis in the EU context.
1 The GTAP version 5 database (Dimaranan & McDougall, 2002) 
is used to carry out the policy simulations. Specifically, we use an aggregated version of the 
database. In the aggregation, most of the agricultural and food products in the original GTAP 
database are retained while non-agricultural goods are grouped into manufacturing and 
services. In light of the focus on the EU, the database is further aggregated along the regional 
dimension but all the 25 member states of the EU are included in the aggregation as separate 
countries. 
The GTAP model is a standard, multi-regional, static, computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model. Like any other applied economic model, this model is of course based on specific 
assumptions both in terms of the theoretical structure as well as the specific parameters and 
the data used. In this model, regional production is produced according to a constant return-
to-scale technology in a perfectly competitive environment, and the private demand system is 
represented by a non-homothetic demand system (a constant difference elasticity function).
2 
The foreign trade structure is characterised by the Armington assumption, implying imperfect 
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. 
3. Scenarios 
3.1  Baseline scenario 
Like previous the rounds of global trade reforms, any multilateral liberalisation following the 
conclusion of the Doha Round will likely take a few years to be implemented. A meaningful 
evaluation of the anticipated policy changes can be obtained by comparing the liberalisation 
scenario with a non-liberalisation scenario. Such a non-liberalisation scenario contains 
projections of the macro economy and incorporates the effects of important policy changes 
other than the exogenous shocks to be analysed. To be consistent with the focus of the paper, 
we construct a non-liberalisation baseline scenario that features a number of important policy 
initiatives by the EU, including the Agenda 2000 reform and the mid-term review (MTR) 
reform of the CAP, the Everything But Arms initiative and EU enlargement. In addition, the 
Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture is assumed to have been completed in this baseline. 
Finally, we apply shocks to GDP, population and total factor productivities to project the 
world economy to the baseline year of 2013 – a year when the market access reforms are also 
assumed to have been completed.  
The basic elements of the baseline scenario have been used in a number of studies conducted 
by the Food and Resource Economics Institute. The most relevant example of these studies is 
by Jensen & Frandsen (2003a), which examines the impact of EU enlargement and the MTR-
                                                 
1 For a more detailed discussion of the many changes to the standard GTAP model, readers are encouraged to see 
a series of working papers published by the Food and Resource Economics Institute on reform of the CAP and 
trade liberalisation under the WTO. These papers can be downloaded from www.foi.dk or can be obtained from 
the authors. 
2 Hence, the present analysis does not include features such as imperfect competition or increasing return to 
scale, which may, however, be important in certain sectors. MULTILATERAL MARKET-ACCESS REFORMS OF THE DOHA ROUND | 3 
 
reform of the CAP against a non-enlargement and non-CAP reform baseline scenario. The 
current study takes one of the enlargement scenarios found in Jensen & Frandsen (2003a) as 
the starting point or baseline scenario. Therefore, the beneficial effects of EU enlargement to 
the 10 new member countries have already been reflected in the baseline case.
3  
3.2  Multilateral market-access reform scenarios 
The July package stipulates a multiple-tiered formula for reducing market access barriers. 
Developing and developed member countries will use different formulas with the former 
facing less-stringent commitments. The least developed members will be exempt from any 
reduction commitments. Yet there are no numerical values assigned to either the tiers or the 
cuts applied to each tier in the July package. Therefore, we are forced to base our analysis on 
an earlier proposal, namely the Harbinson proposal, which preceded the July package. In the 
Harbinson proposal, there are three tiers for developed member countries: 
•  for tariffs higher than 90%, the average cuts shall be 60%;  
•  for tariffs falling between 15% and 90%, the average cuts shall be 50%; and 
•  for tariffs below 15%, the average cuts shall be 40%.  
For developing members, there are four tiers with smaller cuts, specifically, 
•  for tariffs over 120%, the average cuts shall be 40% only;  
•  for tariffs between 60% and 120%, the average cuts shall be 35%;  
•  for tariffs between 20% and 60%, the average cuts shall be 30%; and 
•  and for tariffs lower than 20%, the average cuts shall only be 25%.  
In addition to the Harbinson tiered-approach, we also consider an alternative approach 
according to the Swiss formula, with a coefficient of 25.
4 This alternative formula is 
interesting in that it would lead to greater harmonisation of market access barriers across 
products and member countries. In fact, the tiered formula can be seen as a compromise 
between the Swiss formula approach and the Uruguay Round ‘linear-cuts’ approach. 
Simulation results from the Swiss formula will be used as a reference for benchmarking the 
magnitude of the effects of the tiered formula. 
To illustrate the different cuts in import tariffs implied by the tiered approach and the Swiss 
formula, we present the baseline import tariff rates and those lower rates resulting from the 
assumed market access reforms in Table 1 for the EU and the US. By definition, using the 
Swiss formula will lower high tariffs more than low tariffs and will have a greater impact on 
harmonising the levels of protection across products. The Harbinson tiered-formula is a 
compromise between the Swiss formula approach and the average-cut approach applied in the 
Uruguay Round. As such, the resulting cuts for high tariffs are generally lower in this case, in 
comparison to the Swiss formula approach. 
 
                                                 
3 Details of this baseline scenario can be found in Jensen & Frandsen (2003a and 2003b).  
4 The Swiss formula is specified as follows: Z = AX/(A+X) where X = the initial tariff rate, A = the coefficient 
and the maximum final tariff rate, and Z = the resulting lower tariff rate. So a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 
25 will lower all tariffs to be a level that is lower than 25% after the reductions. 4 | YU & JENSEN 
 
Table 1. Import tariff equivalences, the EU and US, baseline and post-liberalisation levels (%) 
 EU-25    US 
   Baseline Harbinson Swiss   Baseline  Harbinson  Swiss
Paddy rice  32.5 16.2 14.1  4.9  2.9 4.1
Wheat 48.8 24.4 16.5   2.6  1.5  2.3
Other grains  17.5 8.7 10.3   0.6  0.4  0.6
Vegetables fruits and nuts  14.5 8.7 9.2   4.7  2.8  3.9
Oilseeds 0.0 0.0 0.0   17.7  8.8  10.4
Sugar cane and beet  251.4 100.6 22.7   0.7  0.4  0.6
Plant-based fibres  0.0 0.0 0.0   9.7  5.8  7.0
Other crops  3.1 1.9 2.7   21.5  10.8  11.6
Bovine animals  36.6 18.3 14.9  1.1  0.6 1.0
Other animals  6.7 4.0 5.3   0.6  0.4  0.6
Raw milk  0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0  0.0  0.0
Wool 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.9  0.6  0.9
Natural resource  0.3 0.3 0.3  0.4  0.4 0.4
Bovine meat products  71.9 36 18.6  5.3  3.2 4.4
Other meat products  30.9 15.5 13.8  3.6  2.2 3.2
Vegetable oils and fats 11.4 6.8 7.8   4.3  2.6  3.6
Dairy products  76.4 38.2 18.8   42.5  21.2  15.7
Processed rice  87.4 43.7 19.4  5.3  3.2 4.4
Sugar 76.4 38.2 18.8   53.4  26.7  17
Other processed foods  28.8 14.4 13.4  11.4  6.9  7.8
Beverage/tobacco 8.3 5.0 6.3     3.0  1.8  2.7
Sources: GTAP 5 database and authors’ calculations. 
The EU maintains high tariffs on a number of products, including bovine meats (71.9%), 
dairy products (76.4%), rice (87.6%) and sugar (76.4%). The Swiss formula approach will 
bring these down to between 18% and 19%, whereas the Harbinson tiered-formula will cut 
these to between 36% and 44%. For products with lower tariff rates (e.g. grains, vegetables 
and other crops), the Harbinson formula is more effective than the Swiss formula. In contrast, 
market access barriers in the US are generally lower than those in the EU. Therefore, the two 
approaches lead to similar reductions to tariff rates for many products. The only notable 
exceptions are dairy and sugar. For dairy, the 42.5% baseline rate will be cut to 21.2% 
(15.7%) by the Harbinson scenario (Swiss formula). For sugar (with a baseline rate of 53.4%), 
the difference is more pronounced (26.7% versus 17%). 
4. Results 
Results from simulating the two market-access liberalisation scenarios are reported in Tables 
2-5. Since the Harbinson tiered-approach scenario is more realistic in light of the agreement 
to the July package, we focus our attention on the results from the Harbinson scenario when 
discussing the simulated impacts of market access reforms. We may touch upon the results 
from the Swiss formula in the tables, however, for reference purposes and when necessary. 
4.1  Intra-EU trade 
Multilateral market-access reforms will lead to across-the-board decreases in intra-EU trade, 
as can be seen from Table 2. These decreases happen for two reasons. First, one should recall MULTILATERAL MARKET-ACCESS REFORMS OF THE DOHA ROUND | 5 
 
that the market-access reform scenario is simulated against a baseline where EU enlargement 
has been achieved. Lowering the EU’s common external tariff rates will no doubt lead to 
more imports from outside the EU. Second, other WTO members are also assumed to have 
lowered their own market access barriers, a move that will induce more exports from the EU 
and divert some of the intra-EU trade to its external trading partners. 
Not surprisingly, intra-EU trade will drop the most for those products with the highest 
external tariffs (and hence the greatest reductions), including bovine meats, dairy products 
and wheat. Total intra-EU trade will be reduced from the baseline level by around $2.6 billion 
for bovine meats, $3.2 billion for dairy products and over $0.9 billion for wheat. Although the 
baseline tariff rates for rice and sugar are also very high, the absolute reductions of intra-EU 
trade flows are much smaller, owing to the fact that the baseline trade flows for the two 
products are quite small.  
Compared with the Harbinson approach, the Swiss formula would generally result in larger 
cuts to the EU’s common external tariffs and hence larger reductions in intra-EU trade. 
4.2  Extra-EU trade 
To illustrate the changes to the EU’s external trade, we present the results on the EU’s trade 
with the US (the middle panel in Table 2) and with the rest of the world (all non-US trading 
partners, the right panel in Table 3). Here, we focus on the results obtained from the 
Harbinson approach. As the Swiss formula generally implies larger cuts to market access 
barriers, the resulting changes in trade volumes are generally larger than those obtained from 
the Harbinson approach. 
Owing to the different baseline market-access barriers between the EU and the US (as 
presented in Table 1), multilateral market-access reforms will mostly boost imports from the 
US into the EU, especially for bovine meats, wheat, fruit, vegetables and dairy products. On 
the other hand, exports from the EU to the US will largely remain at the baseline level, except 
for other crops and dairy products where baseline tariff rates are relatively high in the US and 
where there are notable increases in exports from the EU. The US also maintains high tariff 
rates for sugar in the baseline. Nevertheless, the EU is not in a position to penetrate the US 
sugar market and there will only be marginal increases in sugar exports from the EU.
5 
Moving beyond the bilateral trade patterns between the EU and US, changes in trade between 
the EU and the rest of the world reveal that multilateral market-access reforms will lead to 
more external trade and less internal trade for the EU. Results from the Harbinson approach 
show that imports of bovine meat and dairy products will each increase by over $3 billion, 
more than the projected decreases in intra-EU imports. Moreover, exports of many products 
from the EU to the rest of world will also increase. On balance, the EU would either 
experience enlarged trade deficits or reduced trade surpluses in many agricultural and food 
products, most notably in bovine meats and dairy products. 
                                                 
5 This is because competitive producers such as Brazil will gain more in the world sugar market under a 
liberalisation scenario. In the current paper the EU sugar regime is not modelled in its entirety; instead we focus 
on the market access barriers only. For the complete modelling of the EU sugar regime, see Frandsen et al. 
(2003). 6 | YU & JENSEN 
 
Table 2. Baseline and post-liberalisation trade flows of the EU, selected products ($US millions, 1997 value) 
  Intra-EU-25  External trade with the US  External trade with the rest of the world (excl. US) 
  Chg. from baseline Changes from baseline  Changes from baseline 
 
Baseline 
value  Harbinson Swiss 
Baseline value 
  Harbinson Swiss 
Baseline value 
  Harbinson Swiss 
  Internal Trade ImportsExports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports  Exports Imports  Exports Imports  Exports
Wheat 3,277  -944  -1,424 191 1 179 0 130 0 319 1,914 605 302 1,294 1,048
Other grains  2,288  -341  -376 738 57 130 2 142 -19 338 720 180 160 288 -57
Veg., fruit, nuts  20,293  -1,595  -2,000 657 907 287 51 407 -140 2,964 7,916 1,370 2,930 2,249 8,333
Oilseeds 1,957  14  -56 2,949 7 -177 2 -186 -1 1,804 368 121 33 588 230
Plant-based fibres  425  -25  -83 175 1 -11 0 -27 0 1,809 745 -14 -42 -44 -132
Other crops  9,310  -433  -592 793 1,014 144 244 103 54 8,089 4,309 264 216 801 -2
Bovine animals  2,064  -162  -294 106 190 -3 4 -7 3 205 550 -13 -11 -25 -20
Other animals  3,474  3  223 221 105 2 1 16 0 2,420 1,753 -31 -4 12 21
Bovine meats  7,656  -2,595  -4,309 528 17 1,094 2 2,037 -1 1,365 897 3,303 225 7,270 491
Other meats  14,134  -567  -621 152 386 226 17 264 -55 231 8,098 452 1,689 793 8,544
Veg. oils and fats  7,985  -684  -691 558 475 123 -8 58 -120 2,639 5,071 878 726 1,223 2,115
Dairy products  15,244  -3,182  -7,407 73 359 344 381 734 537 573 6,024 3,360 2,460 10,955 7,966
Processed rice  614  -221  -469 18 32 69 3 100 -7 498 463 41 34 309 1,463
Sugar 1,874  -155  -138 3 16 17 15 58 23 2,499 2,419 69 126 425 22
Other process.  40,530 -6,728  -7,956 1,521 2,165 1,758 363 1,817 13 7,647 20,004 8,297 5,824 12,289 23,719
Total 157,126  -18,833  -27,115 12,297 10,471 5,237 1,399 6,196 195 36,153 78,495 19,690 24,718 39,622 87,055
Sources: Authors’ calculations from simulations. MULTILATERAL MARKET-ACCESS REFORMS OF THE DOHA ROUND | 7 
 
Table 3. Baseline and post-liberalisation outputs and trade flows for bovine meats at the EU member state level ($US millions, 1997 value) 
  EU-25 production and intra-EU trade   EU external trade 
  % Change  Change in baseline value  Change in baseline value 
 Domestic  production 
Baseline 
value  Harbinson Swiss 
Baseline 
value  Harbinson   Swiss 
    Harbinson  Swiss  Imports Exports Imports Exports  Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports   Imports Exports 
Belgium/Luxembourg -21.7 -36.0    240 304 -170 -121 -214 -197 212 32 245 23  402 65 
Denmark -17.1  -36.0    238 234 -78 -90 -153 -141 19 83 76 9  167 -9 
Germany -12.8  -26.3    1,128 519 -527 -205 -829 -325 278 114 785 24  1,593 4 
Greece -4.3  -10.9    316 8 -87 -4 -173 -6 28 7 123 1 307 0 
Spain -6.2  -13.1    241 326 -113 -118 -170 -202 86 39 233 3  506 -8 
France -9.6  -20.0    1,324 667 -543 -258 -909 -414 258 130 851 47  1,878 126 
Ireland -11.6  -16.2    50 405 -17 -200 -30 -300 6 102 21 46  55 107 
Italy -3.3  -9.0    2,150 162 -258 -74 -664 -116 53 32 290 0  897 -13 
Netherlands -27.2  -44.4    286 1,154 -179 -448 -239 -730 166 156 260 43  438 97 
Austria -3.2  -8.4    169 46 -15 -16 -21 -30 6 4 27 1  98 1 
Portugal -4.8  -12.9    196 7 -57 -3 -113 -5 18 6 79 1  205 1 
Finland -2.3  -6.0    45 8 -11 -2 -23 -4 3 5 16 0  43 -2 
Sweden -2.6  -0.9    223 31 -14 -12 -27 -22 4 7 23 10  89 56 
United Kingdom  -21.3  -39.3   722 226 -459 -108 -614 -167 738 18 1,306 13  2,483 82 
Cyprus/Malta -22.4  -31.6    12 119 -1 -57 -2 -91 0 8 1 9  4 27 
Czech Republic  -1.4  -2.5   18 15 -1 -7 -3 -11 0 0 2 0  5 0 
Estonia -20.5  -31.0    3 36 0 -18 0 -26 0 2 0 1  0 0 
Hungary -11.5  -23.6    81 996 -9 -194 -19 -375 0 18 3 6  9 10 
Latvia -25.0  -35.5    17 19 0 -11 -1 -15 0 1 0 0  1 -1 
Lithuania -27.6  -45.9    12 207 -1 -93 -2 -141 0 37 0 -5  0 -18 
Poland -12.7  -24.9    159 1,324 -54 -308 -97 -554 16 105 57 -6  125 -37 
Slovakia -2.9  -5.2    6 22 0 -8 0 -13 0 0 0 0  1 0 
Slovenia  -25.4  -44.1    21 820  -2 -238  -4 -422 0 9  1 1   4 -1 
Total –  –    7,656 7,656 -2,595 -2,595 -4309 -4,309 1,891 915 4,399 227  9,310 487 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from simulations. 8 | YU & JENSEN 
 
4.3  Bovine meat and dairy products: Detailed impact on individual EU 
member states 
4.3.1 Bovine  meat 
Total internal EU imports of bovine meat is projected to be around $7.7 billion in the baseline 
scenario, as compared with the less than $2 billion of imports from outside of the EU (Table 
3). External exports from the EU are quite insignificant, which are projected to be less than $1 
billion in the baseline. Therefore, without multilateral market-access reforms, intra-EU trade 
in bovine meat would dominate its external trade and the EU would be a small net importer of 
bovine meat in the world market. As a result of EU enlargement, assumed in the baseline, 
some of the new EU member countries are projected to become major exporters in the internal 
market. For instance, Poland’s bovine meat exports to the EU are projected to be $1.3 billion 
in the baseline, followed by almost $1 billion from Hungary and around $0.8 billion from 
Slovenia. On the other hand, none of these new member states will become major importers 
of bovine meat from within the EU. 
Multilateral market-access reforms will lower the common external tariffs of the EU and will 
change the patterns of intra-EU and extra-EU trade, altering the net trade position of the EU in 
the world market for bovine meat.  
First, there will be a significant decline of total intra-EU trade – dropping from around $7.7 
billion to around $5 billion. At the same time, imports from outside the EU will increase 
significantly, rising from less than $2 billion to about $6.3 billion. This drastic surge in 
imports will be accompanied by a modest increase in the EU’s external exports of less than $1 
billion. On balance, the EU will become a far greater net-importer, as compared with the 
baseline projection. The size of intra-EU imports will become smaller than that of its external 
imports, signalling that the EU will be more dependent on the external market of bovine meat. 
Second, the new member states’ position of being large internal exporters will be eroded in 
the presence of multilateral market-access reforms. As can be seen in Table 3, these countries’ 
internal exports will decline universally. The changes in internal exports range from over 
$300 million for Poland and $238 million for Slovenia to $194 million for Hungary. These 
declines are hardly surprising, given that non-EU exporters will be facing lower import 
barriers to the EU market. What is more interesting is that these new member states will not 
be able to expand their exports to the external market, despite the generally more favourable 
market access conditions in those countries (owing to the multilateral market-access reform). 
This is because the now lower market-access barriers in non-EU countries are still not as 
favourable as the tariff-free access offered by the EU-15 countries. As such, the internal 
market of the EU still attracts most of the exports from the new member states. In addition, as 
compared with other exporters to the world market (such as Australia and New Zealand), the 
new EU member states do not possess enough comparative advantages to seize large market 
shares in the external market. 
Third, increased external imports to the EU will be almost all purchased by the EU-15. These 
imports will ‘crowd out’ some of the projected imports from the new member states in the 
baseline scenario. For example, the UK will reduce imports from the internal market 
(declining from $722 million in the baseline to $263 million) and increase imports from the 
external market (an increase of $1.3 billion). Therefore, the net trade positions of many new 
member states will be weakened. MULTILATERAL MARKET-ACCESS REFORMS OF THE DOHA ROUND | 9 
 
Finally, as a result of the previously discussed changes in trade patterns – most notably the 
switch from internal EU imports to extra-EU imports and the decline of the new member 
states’ exports – the output patterns of the individual member states will also change. Bovine-
meat outputs in many new member states will drop by over 20%, which is consistent with 
their losses in the internal market. Some of the EU-15 member states will also suffer big 
drops in bovine meat production, including the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, 
Denmark and Germany. Overall, the bovine meat sector in the EU will contract as a result of 
the assumed multilateral market-access reforms. 
4.3.2 Dairy  products 
The case of dairy products in the EU is quite different from that of bovine meat, as the EU is a 
major producer and exporter of dairy products. Although internal trade in the EU (projected to 
be over $15 billion in the baseline scenario) dominates its total exports of dairy products, its 
exports to the external market are also quite significant ($6.4 billion in the baseline). The 
border protection maintained by the EU in the baseline scenario ensures that few imports can 
penetrate the EU market. In fact, this is projected to be only $645 million in the baseline, a 
paltry sum as compared with total internal EU trade. Unlike bovine meat, the new member 
states are both importers and exports of dairy products produced within the EU. In total, these 
countries have a combined position of being a small net-importer. 
The assumed market access reforms will reduce the import tariff maintained by the EU from 
76.4% to 38.2% according to the Harbinson tiered-formula. This will certainly lead to more 
external imports into the EU, leading to a replacement of some of the intra-EU imports with 
external imports. On the other hand, being a big producer in the world dairy market, the EU 
will also gain from other countries’ market-access reforms by exporting more to the external 
market. As such, there will a switch of exports from the internal EU market to the external 
market for the dairy products produced in the EU. Table 4 illustrates this point. Specifically, 
the EU as a whole will trade less within itself, as seen by a drop of nearly $3.2 billion in intra-
EU imports of dairy products. Its exports to the rest of the world will increase by $2.8 billion 
and its external imports will expand by $3.7 billion, resulting in a decrease of less than $1 
billion in its net exports. 
The modest decline of the EU’s net exports implies that the overall EU production level will 
only be affected marginally. Indeed this is the case according to the results on total dairy 
outputs in the EU. The production level of dairy products is by and large dictated by the milk 
quota assigned to individual member countries. For member states whose baseline quotas are 
binding, there are little changes in their dairy outputs. But for those members whose milk 
quotas are not fulfilled in the baseline scenario, a decline in the internal EU market price of 
milk as a result of the lowering of import tariffs will drive some of the producers out of 
business and thus will further lower the quota-fill ratios in these countries. This is the case for 
countries such as Germany, Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden.  
Changes in net trade positions – in internal trade and external trade – vary at the member state 
level. There are generally small changes for the new member states. Many of these countries 
are small importers/exporters and their exports to the EU market will decline slightly. At the 
same time, they will not be able to gain market shares in the world market. 
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Table 4. Baseline and post-liberalisation outputs and trade flows for dairy products at the EU member-state level ($US millions) 
  EU-25 production and intra-EU trade     EU external trade 
  % Change in  Change in baseline value    Change in baseline value 
 domestic  production 
Baseline value 
  Harbinson   Swiss   
Baseline value
   Harbinson    Swiss 
   Harbinson  Swiss    Imports Exports   Imports Exports   Imports Exports   ImportsExports   Imports Exports   Imports Exports 
Belgium/Lux. 1.8  -12.1    1,429 1,363 -385 -122  -907 -472  45 340  262 131  687 192 
Denmark 0.3  0.6    201 827 -44 -335  -108 -587  16 713  97 470  297 942 
Germany -8.1  -23.5    2,634 3,695 -564 -884  -1,315 -2,007  127 961  763 -35  2,388 -429 
Greece -1.5  -6.9    351 107 -18 -28  -54 -61  3 44  22 19  89 14 
Spain -3.5  -11.7    657 363 -64 -97  -197 -214  13 118  94 12  373 -28 
France 0.2  -0.3    1,927 2,065 -428 -479  -1,007 -1,103  105 1,108  610 919  1,895 2,363 
Ireland 0.2  -0.2    137 1,067 -36 -190  -78 -440  6 447  30 155  80 319 
Italy 0.1  16.7    2,130 471 -513 -129  -1,077 -340  98 255  612 513  2,266 3,912 
Netherlands 0.7  1.1    1,809 2,213 -308 -425  -803 -948  41 1,395  260 486  830 1,045 
Austria -5.2  -16.7    221 236 -44 -59  -99 -141  11 30  62 34  204 72 
Portugal -0.4  -0.7    220 57 -28 -10  -79 -27  5 13  30 15  116 71 
Finland -5.3  -14.2    97 92 -26 -23  -58 -53  5 170  32 -43  103 -99 
Sweden -2.7  -7.2    127 221 -28 -54  -57 -138  6 71  39 13  143 -20 
United Kingdom  -5.3  -16.5   1,232 925 -457 -214  -821 -526  149 597  671 117  1,753 52 
Cyprus/Malta 0.4  -0.8    92 38 -5 -8  -12 -20  0 2  1 4  6 13 
Czech Republic  -0.2  -0.9   115 250 -10 -22  -31 -50  0 18  2 4  7 -1 
Estonia -0.8  -2.6    93 99 -9 -6  -28 -18  0 3  4 -1  14 -2 
Hungary -0.1  -0.4    205 212 -21 -35  -68 -90  2 20  16 31  64 89 
Latvia -4.7  -13.7    69 75 -5 -10  -16 -27  0 2  2 -1  7 -2 
Lithuania -0.4  -1.6    76 163 -11 -11  -35 -26  1 7  7 4  25 6 
Poland 0.4  0.1    1,152 563 -155 -35  -491 -96  11 46  83 4  318 11 
Slovakia -0.2  -0.8    125 17 -5 -3  -14 -7  0 1  1 0  6 0 
Slovenia  -0.1  -0.7   145 124  -19 -3   -51 -15   1 22  3 -10  18 -17 
Total –  –    15,244 15,244 -3,182 -3,182  -7,407 -7,407 645 6,383 3,703 2,841  11,689 8,503 
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In fact, the adjustment of the EU’s net trade positions will be largely reflected in the changes 
in the positions of the EU-15 member states. The switch from intra-EU imports to extra-EU 
imports is quite evident in the cases of Germany, France, Italy and the UK. The respective 
decreases (increases) in their imports from within the EU (from outside of the EU) in millions 
of US dollars are: $564 ($163) million, $428 ($610) million, $513 ($612) million and $457 
($671) million. Moreover, the lower market access barriers of other countries will stimulate 
more exports from some EU-15 countries, notably France, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Denmark.  
4.4  Welfare effects 
The above analysis discusses the changing trade and production patterns of agricultural and 
food products for the EU, with the emphasis on bovine meat and dairy products. Yet, such a 
focus ignores the impact of consumers and therefore provides an incomplete picture of the 
overall impact of market access reforms on the individual EU member states. For this reason, 
we now turn to an evaluation of the welfare implications of such reforms by computing the 
equivalent variation of moving from the baseline to the post-reform equilibrium. Detailed 
results are provided in Table 5. 
Following such market-access reforms, the world as a whole will gain in excess of $42 
billion, as compared with the no-reform baseline scenario. Within the EU, we observe a clear 
pattern that the EU-15 countries gain significantly in terms of money metric values while the 
new member states lose marginally. To understand these diverging results, we offer a simple 
decomposition of the total welfare effect into its two main components, the efficiency effect 
and the terms-of-trade effect. 
The EU-15 member states generally gain from improved efficiency. More broadly, the larger 
the size of the member country, the greater the gain is. For instance, Germany, France, Italy 
and the UK will all have efficiency gains in excess of $1 billion. Many of these countries, on 
the other hand, lose slightly on terms-of-trade. The main reason for the latter is that their 
losses from lowering their own market access barriers are greater than their gains from higher 
world market prices for their exports. Nevertheless, these terms-of-trade losses are quite small 
in comparison to the efficiency gains. As such, all the EU-15 countries will gain from the 
market access reforms. 
For the new member states, the efficiency gains are typically small as these countries will not 
be able to adjust their production patterns to the changes in the world market, owing to the 
fact that their trade is predominantly with other EU countries. Further, all these countries will 
suffer small terms-of-trade losses, because as the common external tariffs of the EU are 
lowered, they suffer from higher world market prices for their imports. Meanwhile, they will 
not be able to take advantage of the higher world market prices because they will not be able 
to expand their extra-EU exports. Moreover, reducing the common external tariffs of the EU 
will lead to lower domestic prices in the internal market, which consequently hurts those net 
exporters in the internal market, including many new member states.  12 | YU & JENSEN 
 
Table 5. Changes in economic welfare, selected countries ($US millions, 1997 value) 
 Harbinson  tiered-approach    Swiss  formula   
  % Change 
in utility 
Total  
change Efficiency TOT Other   % Change 
in utility 
Total  
change  Efficiency TOT Other
Belgium/Lux. 0.12 343 458 -131 16  0.20 560 761 -184 -17
Denmark 0.23  413 201 155 57 0.50  925 344 495 86
Germany 0.06  1,330 1,478 -18 -131 0.10  2,093 2,740 -39 -608
Greece 0.10  132 174 -29 -13  0.17  233 354 -83 -39
Spain 0.10  621 721 -70 -30  0.22  1,415 1,386 147 -119
France 0.10  1,604 1,382 186 35  0.21  3,292 2,459 922 -89
Ireland 0.02  21 62 -96 55  0.03  43 95 -141 89
Italy 0.11  1,467 1,151 319 -3  0.37  4,801 2,683 1,760 358
Netherlands 0.11  497 566 -109 39  0.32  1,394 1,292 120 -18
Austria 0.12  282 207 70 5  1.12  2,546 1,509 978 59
Portugal 0.14  169 174 -6 1  0.46  551 283 57 211
Finland 0.06  85 111 -7 -19  0.05  79 199 -43 -76
Sweden 0.13  344 220 147 -23  1.21  3,296 1,749 1,634 -88
United Kingdom 0.13 1,995 1,805 287 -96 0.25 3,726 3,014 995 -282
Cyprus/Malta 0.05  7 3 -6 10  0.84 122 -32 57 97
Czech Rep.  -0.02  -12 11 -23 -1  -0.03  -20 21 -48 6
Estonia 0.13  7 10 -3 1  0.28  16 19 -6 2
Hungary -0.11  -73 18 -97 5  -0.12  -77 17 -167 73
Latvia 0.11  7 15 -6 -2  -0.01  -1 23 -19 -4
Lithuania -0.22  -25 21 -34 -12 -0.45  -50 42 -67 -24
Poland -0.04  -72 181 -210 -43  -0.14  -257 330 -470 -117
Slovakia -0.02  -5 8 -11 -2  -0.03  -8 16 -21 -3
Slovenia -0.12  -28 21 -42 -7  -0.30  -69 39 -93 -14
World –  42,375 42,380 -5 0  –  94,733 94,819 -82 -3
Note: Economic welfare is measured as the money metric value of the equivalent variation. 
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Having discussed the negative terms-of-trade effects for the new member states, it is worth 
noting that these terms-of-trade losses are no indication of how these countries will fare in 
2013, as compared with the pre-enlargement situation. Rather, they reflect the changes against 
our baseline projection, in which these countries are assumed to gain from joining the EU. 
Therefore, these losses are just slight erosions of the benefits derived from EU accession. 
5.  Summary and concluding remarks 
As expected, the tiered-formula approach as stipulated in the July package would subject the 
EU to larger cuts to its high external tariffs. Such cuts would lead to across-the-board 
decreases in intra-EU trade flows compared with a non-liberalisation baseline scenario. While 
intra-EU trade flows would decrease, the EU’s trade with the rest of the world would 
increase. Such increases would not be symmetric, however – imports into the EU would 
increase more than exports from the EU, resulting in larger external trade deficits or smaller 
external trade surpluses for many of the agricultural and food products for the EU. 
The redirection from intra-EU trade to extra-EU trade and the changes in net trade positions at 
the member state level are exemplified in the cases of bovine meat and dairy products. The 
baseline projections show that the EU’s bovine meat trade would be primarily conducted 
within the EU and that the EU would be a small net importer in the world market. Multilateral 
market-access reforms will induce a significant decline in the intra-EU trade of bovine meats, 
a large increase in imports from outside the EU and a modest increase in exports from the EU 
to the rest of the world. Underlying this shift in trade patterns is an erosion in the role of the 
new member states as large exporters to the internal EU market and their inability to redirect 
their exports to the world market. Their intra-EU exports will be crowded out by external 
imports. Finally, these changes would lead to significant contractions of bovine meat 
production in the EU.  
Unlike the case of trade in bovine meat, according to the baseline projection, the EU has not 
only large internal trade flows of dairy products but also significant exports of these products 
to the world market. Multilateral market-access reforms will allow for more imports into the 
EU and lead to less intra-EU trade. The EU’s exports to the rest of the world will also 
increase, however, resulting in only a minor drop of its net exports. Total outputs of dairy 
products in the EU will change very little, as a result of the fact that raw milk quotas in many 
member states are binding in the baseline scenario. Nevertheless, changes in the net trade 
position and output levels vary across member states. Again, the new member states will not 
be able to expand their external exports.  
A balanced evaluation of the effects of multilateral market-access reforms is provided through 
the calculated changes in economic welfare. While welfare for most of the countries involved 
will improve, the distribution of such gains across EU member states is uneven. The EU-15 
member states generally gain from improved efficiency. The new member states, however, 
will only experience a marginal efficiency improvement but will likely suffer terms-of-trade 
losses, thereby losing some of the benefits of having joined the EU (these benefits are 
reflected in the baseline projections). 
Before concluding the paper, we would like to point out several caveats regarding the 
numerical results. First, the results reported in the paper are changes based on the baseline 
projections. Therefore, they should not be considered as predictions of the trade and 
production patterns of EU agriculture in 2013. Rather, they only reflect the effects of the 
assumed market access reforms. Second, our analysis is based on a rather aggregated database 14 | YU & JENSEN 
 
and the cuts are applied to the average protection levels of these aggregated products. In 
reality, tariff cuts are conducted at tariff-line levels. Therefore, the effects of reducing these 
tariffs may be different even if we have applied the correct average tariff cuts. Third, the 
GTAP database underlying the simulations is the version 5 database, which has a rather old 
base year of 1997. This can certainly be improved with the final release of the version 6 
database in the very near future. Finally, we want to reiterate that the multilateral trade-
liberalisation scenario considered in the paper only concerns market access reforms. The 
inclusion of reforms of export competition measures and domestic supports will no doubt 
change the quantitative results obtained here. 
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